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Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey: The Ninth Circuit’s 
Expansion of the Exclusionary Rule in Immigration 
Hearings Contradicts the Supreme Court’s Lopez-
Mendoza Decision 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey,1 the Ninth Circuit faced the issue 
of whether statements by Lopez-Rodriguez, given to immigration 
officials after they entered Lopez-Rodriguez’s residence without an 
invitation or warrant, should be suppressed in a civil immigration 
hearing.2 The court applied a reasonableness standard to the officers’ 
actions and held that the evidence should be suppressed because the 
entry was an unreasonable violation of Lopez-Rodriguez’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.3  
The Ninth Circuit, however, wrongly decided Lopez-Rodriguez 
because the court applied a reasonableness standard that is an overly 
broad interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.4 The 
reasonableness standard is the established rule in the Ninth Circuit 
for the suppression of evidence in civil immigration cases.5 This rule 
has been extrapolated from dicta in the Supreme Court’s 1984 
Lopez-Mendoza decision, which created the bright-line rule that the 
exclusionary rule, which suppressing evidence obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment, is not applicable in immigration 
hearings.6 However, in dicta supported by four Justices, a plurality 
allowed for an exception that allows for application of the 
exclusionary rule in instances of egregious Fourth Amendment 
 
 1. 536 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 2. Id. at 1013–14. I use the term “immigration hearing” rather than the more narrow 
term “deportation hearing” because use of the exclusionary rule and the Ninth Circuit 
standard apply to all immigration hearings and not only the subset of deportation hearings.  
 3. Id. at 1018–19. 
 4. While several judges voted to grant a rehearing en banc to review this standard, the 
motion was denied. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Due to the change in Attorney General, Holder’s name has replaced Mukasey’s on the order 
denying rehearing. Id. at 1098.  
 5. Lopez-Rodriguez, 536 F.3d at 1018 (citing Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 
1449 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 6. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). 
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violations.7 The Ninth Circuit’s reasonableness standard is an 
excessively broad interpretation of the “egregious” dicta from Lopez-
Mendoza.  
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Immigration officers visited the residence of Lopez-Rodriguez 
on a tip that someone there was using a false birth certificate.8 
Lopez-Rodriguez apparently answered the door, but left the officers 
standing outside while she went to get her niece, Gastelum, whom 
the officers suspected was using a false birth certificate with the name 
Sugeyra.9 When the niece arrived, the door was slightly open.10 She 
looked out at the officers, but did not open the door when they 
asked for her name.11 While what happened next was disputed, the 
immigration judge (“IJ”) found that the officers entered the house 
without obtaining consent—by apparently pushing the door open 
and walking inside.12 Once inside, the officers continued questioning 
the niece who soon admitted that she was using a false birth 
certificate.13 The officers arrested Gastelum, and they arrested Lopez-
Rodriguez under the suspicion that she was also in the country 
illegally. While in custody, both admitted to being in the country 
illegally.14 
Lopez-Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress the evidence and 
testimony obtained by the officers, claiming an egregious Fourth 
Amendment violation had occurred. She claimed her niece’s initial 
admission was given during an egregiously unconstitutional search of 
her residence; consequently, she argued the arrests were unlawful 
and statements made while in custody should be suppressed because 
the exclusionary rule may apply in civil immigration hearings if an 
egregious Fourth Amendment violation occurred.15 The IJ found 
 
 7. Id.  
 8. Lopez-Rodriguez, 536 F.3d at 1013–14. 
 9. See id. at 1014.  
 10. Id.  
 11. See id. at 1014–15. 
 12. Id. at 1015. These facts are not totally clear, as the officers claimed consent was 
given. However, because the IJ found no consent, the Ninth Circuit only provided Lopez-
Rodriguez’s version of the facts.  
 13. Id. at 1014. 
 14. See id.  
 15. I am assuming this was the argument made as the IJ decision is not published. I use 
the term “egregious” in referring to Lopez-Rodriguez’s arguments in part to lay out the 
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“‘some Fourth Amendment problems with the manner of entering 
and questioning,’” but held that the Fourth Amendment violation 
was not sufficiently “egregious” to allow suppression.16 Both Lopez-
Rodriguez and Gastelum were ordered to be deported,17 and on a 
subsequent appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), 
the IJ’s decision was upheld.18 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, in a 
five to four decision.19 This landmark case held that the exclusionary 
rule is inapplicable in immigration hearings.20 This section is divided 
into three parts. First, it provides a summary of Lopez-Mendoza and 
how it opened the door for exceptions to its holding. Second, it 
addresses the narrow exceptions the First and Second Circuits have 
established regarding using the exclusionary rule in immigration 
hearings. Third, it describes the development of the reasonableness 
standard in the Ninth Circuit—which has opened the door to broad 
exceptions to Lopez-Mendoza. 
A. Lopez-Mendoza: Barring Application of the Exclusionary Rule in 
Immigration Hearings 
The issue before the Court in Lopez-Mendoza was whether an 
admission of being in the country illegally should be suppressed in an 
immigration hearing when the admission was obtained following an 
unlawful arrest.21 
In Lopez-Mendoza, immigration officers obtained permission 
from the personnel manager of a potato plant in Washington to 
check for illegal aliens. Sandoval-Sanchez, a defendant in the case, 
 
general law that governs the issue. 
 16. Id. at 1015. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1014. 
 19. 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984). 
 20. Id. at 1050. The specific facts of the case dealt with immigration hearings, which are 
civil hearings. The Court’s holding was broad, however, and included all civil hearings. Id. at 
1038. 
 21. Id. at 1034. Lopez-Mendoza was a consolidation of two Ninth Circuit cases, but the 
Court dismissed Lopez-Mendoza’s case on a technicality. Id. at 1039–40. Interestingly, 
Lopez-Mendoza’s case involved a much more egregious Fourth Amendment violation than the 
other case, where an auto shop owner had refused to allow INS agents to enter his shop, and 
one agent entered while the other was distracting the owner. Id. at 1035–36. 
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was arrested as a result of this workplace raid.22 After his arrest, 
Sandoval-Sanchez admitted that he unlawfully entered the United 
States.23 He later argued that his admission should be suppressed in 
his immigration hearing because he had been illegally arrested.24 The 
IJ held that the arrest was legal, but in the alternative, even if it was 
illegal, that the legality of the arrest had no bearing on evidence in a 
deportation hearing.25 The BIA dismissed Sandoval-Sanchez’s 
appeal, concluding “that the circumstances of the arrest had not 
affected the voluntariness of his recorded admission.”26  
The Ninth Circuit heard the case en banc and reversed the BIA’s 
decision.27 The court determined that Sandoval-Sanchez had been 
unlawfully arrested and that the exclusionary rule barred his 
subsequent admission.28 The court applied a cost-benefit test from 
United States v. Janis29 and held that the marginal costs of imposing 
the exclusionary rule in immigration hearings were “far 
outweigh[ed]” by the benefits of deterring wrongful acts by INS 
agents.30 It also held that alternatives to the exclusionary rule 
proposed by the BIA were insufficient protections in comparison to 
the exclusionary rule.31  
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit.32 The Court held that the exclusionary rule does not 
automatically apply in civil deportation hearings because they are 
 
 22. Id. at 1036–37. The officers did not have a search or an arrest warrant. Lopez-
Mendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 23. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1037. 
 24. Id. Specifically, his attorney argued that the arrest was unlawful because it was 
obtained without a warrant, the methods used were unlawful, and Sandoval-Sanchez had never 
been informed of his right to remain silent. Lopez-Mendoza, 705 F.2d at 1060 n.1. During the 
raid, the agents stood at an entrance to the factory and questioned, in English, anyone who 
appeared nervous. If a worker could not respond in English, he was asked more detailed 
questions in Spanish and was arrested if he admitted to being in the United States illegally or if 
the agents suspected such was the case. The officers did not specifically remember Sandoval-
Sanchez’s suspicious activities as they arrested thirty-seven plant employees that day. Upon 
further questioning at the county jail, he admitted to entering the United States illegally. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1036–37. 
 25. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1037. 
 26. Id. at 1038. 
 27. Lopez-Mendoza, 705 F.2d at 1060–61.  
 28. Id. at 1061. 
 29. 428 U.S. 433, 453–54 (1976). 
 30. Lopez-Mendoza, 705 F.2d at 1073. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:16 PM 
51 Ninth Circuit’s Expansion of the Exclusionary Rule 
 55 
aimed at stopping a “continuing violation of the immigration laws” 
rather than punishing past transgressions, which is the aim of 
criminal prosecutions.33 It based its holding on cost-benefit 
analysis.34  
Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority and reasoned that the 
exclusionary rule’s effectiveness in deterring wrongful acts by 
immigration officers is minimal for two reasons. First, the 
exclusionary rule does not allow the identity of a person to be 
suppressed; therefore, deportation would likely be ordered even if 
the rule were applied because the INS only has to prove identity and 
lack of documentation.35 Second, immigration officers are aware that 
very few respondents ever challenge their arrest.36 O’Connor 
concluded that internal INS regulations and the possibility of a 
declaratory judgment against agency wrongful actions are more likely 
to positively affect officer actions than the exclusionary rule.37 
The Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit regarding the costs 
of applying the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings, calling 
social costs in deportation proceedings both “unusual and 
significant.”38 These high costs included allowing the commission of 
an ongoing crime39 and hampering the INS’s efficient hearing 
process.40 Specifically regarding workplace raids, Justice O’Connor 
stated that Fourth Amendment claims, if permitted, would preclude 
the practice because officers would be forced to create a more 
complete record of each arrest.41 
 
 33. Id. at 1039.  
 34. Id. at 1041 (citing Janis, 428 U.S. at 446).  
 35. Id. at 1043.  
 36. Id. at 1044.  
 37. Id. at 1043–45. O’Connor placed emphasis on the internal INS regulations, in the 
form of rules, training, and disciplinary actions, which were designed to prevent Fourth 
Amendment violations. Id. at 1044–45. 
 38. Id. at 1046.  
 39. Id. at 1046–47. The Court applied the rule via analogy as it previously had been 
applied to instances where the exclusionary rule barred prosecution of a crime, but did not 
mandate that seized objects that are illegal to possess be returned. Id. (citing United States v. 
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1991); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948)). 
 40. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1048. O’Connor pointed out that an immigration 
judge typically holds multiple hearings per day and that neither the agency nor the immigrant’s 
attorney are likely to be well versed in Fourth Amendment law in order to quickly deal with 
the Fourth Amendment issues. Id.  
 41. Id. at 1049–50. 
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The Court held that these two high costs of condoning an 
ongoing illegal act and thwarting efficient administration outweigh 
the low benefit that the exclusionary rule provides in deterring 
Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, the exclusionary rule should 
not apply in civil proceedings.42  
However, Part V of the Lopez-Mendoza decision—consisting of 
one paragraph—stated that the Court did not address “egregious 
violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might 
transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the 
probative value of the evidence obtained.”43 This single sentence has 
given rise to a circuit split regarding what constitutes such an 
egregious violation.44 
Part V, which is the last section in the decision and comes after 
all of the Court’s reasoning and holding, is clearly dicta. 
Furthermore, one Justice, of the five-Justice majority, did not join in 
this section45—thus, as a plurality section, it does not carry the force 
of law. 
B. The Circuit Split: Standards Developed by the First and Second 
Circuits Regarding Egregious Violations 
The First Circuit requires that an immigrant show a Fourth 
Amendment violation in the form of a clear “threat[], coercion, or 
physical abuse” to qualify for the egregious exception.46 In 
Kandamar v. Gonzales, an immigrant challenged numerous aspects 
of a Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) interview that 
resulted in deportation proceedings.47 The First Circuit stated that 
Lopez-Mendoza generally bars suppression in immigration hearings, 
but the Supreme Court left “a glimmer of hope” that evidence may 
be suppressed in cases of egregious Fourth Amendment violations.48 
In further defining an egregious violation, the court reasoned that 
 
 42. See id. at 1050–51.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Part V also states that the decision does not address widespread abuses by 
immigration officials. Id. However, this Note does not examine this possible exception because 
my research did not turn up any published cases where an immigrant sought this exception.  
 45. Id. at 1034. 
 46. Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 47. Id. at 67. 
 48. Id. at 70 (quoting Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 22–23 (1st Cir. 
2004)). 
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there was no evidence of “threats, coercion or physical abuse . . . that 
would constitute egregious government conduct” and there was no 
evidence of a forced retention in the DHS interview.49 The First 
Circuit has thus established a high bar for application of the 
egregious exception.  
The Second Circuit’s rule likely falls somewhere in between the 
narrow First Circuit exception and the broad Ninth Circuit 
exception.50 In Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, a border patrol officer 
asked Almeida-Amaral to stop and provide identification as Almeida-
Amaral entered a gas station.51 Almeida-Amaral gave the officer a 
Brazilian passport and was immediately arrested.52 The IJ denied the 
immigrant’s motion to suppress based on a suspicionless stop and 
the BIA sustained the decision.53 
The Second Circuit established a rule allowing application of the 
exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings if “the [Fourth 
Amendment] violation—regardless of its egregiousness or 
unfairness—undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.”54 
Thus, the Second Circuit rule is not based on the egregious 
exception, but seems to be derived from the Court’s policy of not 
suppressing evidence in immigration hearings that is credible.55 The 
court held that a suspicionless stop, by itself, was not enough to be 
egregious, and some additional offending conduct must have 
occurred.56 In dicta, the court also stated the bright-line rule, based 
on Ninth Circuit precedent, that a race-based stop would be an 
egregious violation.57 Even though the court relied heavily on Ninth 
Circuit precedent, it adopted a narrow, race-based exception rather 
than the Ninth Circuit’s broad reasonableness exception. 
 
 49. Id. at 71–72. 
 50. See infra Part III.C. 
 51. 461 F.3d 231, 232–33 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 233. 
 54. Id. at 235.  
 55. Interestingly, this policy was relied upon by the IJ and BIA in Lopez-Mendoza, but 
did not play an important role in the Supreme Court’s decision in that case. See supra  notes 
25–26 and accompanying text.  
 56. Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235–36. 
 57. Id. Specifically, the court relied on the Ninth Circuit case Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 
22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994). For further discussion of Gonzalez-Rivera, see infra notes 58–
66 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Unreasonable Standard in the Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit has developed a broader exception to Lopez-
Mendoza than the First and Second Circuits. This exception, which 
in essence asks whether the actions by peace or immigration officers 
were unreasonable violations of the Fourth Amendment, all but 
swallows the rule of barring the exclusionary rule in immigration 
proceedings. 
The Ninth Circuit adopted the unreasonable standard in 
Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS.58 In this case, an immigration officer 
claimed he pulled Gonzalez-Rivera over because he “fail[ed] to look 
at the Border Patrol car; . . . appeared to have a ‘dry’ mouth; . . . was 
blinking; . . . and [had a] Hispanic appearance.”59 The IJ suppressed 
the documents found in the car, holding that the immigration officer 
stopped Gonzalez-Rivera solely based on race and that such a stop 
was an egregious Fourth Amendment violation.60 The BIA reversed, 
stating that race was not the sole factor.61 The Ninth Circuit reversed 
the BIA, concluding that the IJ was correct in deciding that the 
officer had pulled Gonzalez-Rivera over solely based on his race.62 
Rather than merely holding, as the IJ did, that a race-based stop 
is sufficiently egregious for the exclusionary rule to apply,63 the 
Ninth Circuit used reasoning from a previous case regarding a civil 
IRS hearing and established a much broader rule—that any bad faith 
constitutional violation is egregious.64 The court then defined a bad 
 
 58. 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994). See generally Benitez-Mendez v. INS, 760 F.2d 907 
(9th Cir. 1985) (amended). The first Ninth Circuit case that addressed the issue, Benitez-
Mendez, is not discussed because later cases have ignored that early decision. In that case, an 
immigration officer detained an immigrant in the officer’s car while the officer searched the 
immigrant’s vehicle. Id. at 908–09. The court simply held that the exclusionary rule no longer 
applied in civil deportation proceedings. Id. at 909–10. 
 59. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1446. 
 60. Id. at 1442. 
 61. Id. at 1442–43. 
 62. Id. at 1446–48. 
 63. This was the rule the Second Circuit adopted based on this case. See Almeida-Amaral 
v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234–35 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 64. In a novel bit of legal footwork, the court sidestepped the fact that the egregious 
dicta from Lopez-Mendoza was not joined by a majority of the Court by arguing that the 
dissenting Justices surely “would have approved” of weakening the bright-line rule by allowing 
for an egregious exception. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1448 n.2. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has 
concluded that “to the extent such head-counting is a helpful way of reading Supreme Court 
opinions, there were eight votes on the Lopez-Mendoza Court for at least leaving open the 
possibility that the exclusionary rule might apply to egregious violations.” Orhorhaghe v. INS, 
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faith violation as one where evidence is obtained “by deliberate 
violations of the fourth amendment, or by conduct a reasonable 
officer should have known is a violation of the Constitution.”65 The 
court then attempted to narrow this broad rule: 
In applying an objective standard of “bad faith” . . . we emphasize 
that in the present case we only determine what constitutes a bad 
faith stop based solely on race . . . and do not purport to be setting 
forth the standard for determining what constitutes a bad faith 
constitutional violation in other contexts.66  
This limiting language, however, failed to deter litigants from 
seeking additional “unreasonable” exceptions—as Lopez-Rodriguez 
demonstrates. 
Merely holding that a race-based stop is an egregious Fourth 
Amendment violation, and thus is an exception to the Lopez-
Mendoza rule, would have kept the Ninth Circuit more closely in line 
with the precedent set by Lopez-Mendoza, which possibly allowed for 
narrow exceptions to be developed as the First and Second Circuits 
have done. However, the Ninth Circuit chose to use a broad 
reasonableness standard, which in turn has invited additional 
litigation as other defendants seek to suppress evidence in 
immigration hearings. 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN LOPEZ-RODRIGUEZ V. 
MUKASEY 
In Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey,67 the Ninth Circuit added a new 
egregious exception: Any unconstitutional search of a residence is 
unreasonable and, therefore, evidence that is a fruit of the search 
must be suppressed under the egregious exception. In an interesting 
commentary, the court quoted an earlier decision stating that the 
egregious language from Lopez-Mendoza was a “suggestion” to 
create such exceptions.68 
 
38 F.3d 488, 493 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1448 n.2). While 
logical, this argument ignores the fact that a dissenting Justice could have joined section five 
and given it the power of law. No Justice chose to do so, and the dicta supported by four 
Justices should not have been heavily relied on as law. 
 65. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1449 (quoting Adamson v. Comm’r, 745 F.2d 541, 
545 (9th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. 
 67. 536 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 68. Id. at 1016 (quoting Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 493). 
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In establishing its rule in Lopez-Rodriguez, the court first stated 
the Circuit’s established rule that a reasonableness standard is used to 
determine whether the egregious exception from Lopez-Mendoza 
should apply.69 It then quoted the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Payton v. New York70 to establish that “[i]t is a basic principle of 
Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”71 Thus, the 
court concluded that any information attained as a result of the 
nonconsensual entry in this case would be suppressed in a criminal 
case.72 It then reasoned that since warrantless and nonconsensual 
entries are prohibited, any such entry would be unreasonable and 
“[t]hus, the INS agents’ Fourth Amendment violation was 
‘egregious’ under [the] Circuit’s controlling interpretation of the 
term.”73 
Judge Bybee wrote a concurring opinion. He argued that the 
ruling was in conformity with the current rule of the Ninth Circuit, 
but raised the concern that the circuit’s rule contradicts Lopez-
Mendoza. He argued the exception was broader than intended and 
threatened to “swallow up the rule.”74 Judge Bybee also noted the 
potential circuit split between the broad Ninth Circuit rule and the 
more narrow rules of other circuits.75 
The government moved for a rehearing en banc, but in March of 
2009, the motion was denied.76 In a dissent to the denial, authored 
by Judge Bea and joined by four other judges, Bea argued that the 
current Ninth Circuit rule clearly contradicts Lopez-Mendoza because 
the reasonableness standard is equivalent to a qualified immunity 
standard77—and qualified immunity is applicable in non-egregious 
 
 69. Id.; see supra Part III.C. 
 70. 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits officers 
from entering a residence to make an arrest without a warrant or consent). 
 71. Lopez-Rodriguez, 536 F.3d at 1016 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 
586 (1980)). 
 72. Id. at 1018. 
 73. Id. at 1019 (citing Adamson v. Comm’r, 745 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 1984)).  
 74. Id. at 1019–20 (Bybee, J., concurring). 
 75. Id. at 1020–21; see supra Part III.B. 
 76. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009) (Holder’s name 
was substituted for Mukasey’s). 
 77. Pursuant to qualified immunity, government officials performing discretionary 
functions are immune from liability as long as their conduct does not “violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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situations.78 Bea further criticized the standard because it relies on 
officer knowledge.79 He prefers the First and Second Circuit 
egregious standards that focus on officer conduct, not knowledge.80 
V. ANALYSIS  
Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey widens the circuit split over the 
egregious exception; consequently, the Supreme Court can be 
reasonably expected to take up this matter at some point in the 
future. This section provides three reasons why the Supreme Court 
should eliminate the egregious exception—especially the Ninth 
Circuit’s version of the rule. First, the circuits that accept an 
egregious exception ignore the cost-benefit test and the Court’s 
reasoning in Lopez-Mendoza. Second, there is a perverse incentive in 
using the exclusionary rule for ongoing crimes. And third, the Court 
has taken steps to diminish the importance of the exclusionary rule 
since Lopez-Mendoza. 
Each of these three reasons is premised on the fact that the 
current Ninth Circuit rule encourages the type of time-consuming 
analysis by immigration judges that the Lopez-Mendoza majority 
sought to avoid.81 In using cost-benefit analysis, the Lopez-Mendoza 
court did not condone unconstitutional actions by immigration 
officials; it merely concluded it would be cost prohibitive to use 
immigration hearings and case-by-case analysis of Fourth 
Amendment violations, to remedy such actions.82 
The Ninth Circuit has ignored this reasoning by establishing 
multiple exceptions to the general rule that evidence should not be 
suppressed in immigration hearings.83 Furthermore, Lopez-Rodriguez 
established an entirely new exception. Establishing the 
“nonconsensual entry of a residence exception” advocated in Lopez-
 
 78. Id. at 1101 n.7 (Bea, J., dissenting) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 
(2001)). 
 79. Id. at 1104–05. 
 80. Id. at 1105–06. 
 81. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1049–50 (1984). 
 82. Id. at 1050. 
 83. See supra Part III.C. 
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Rodriguez will surely encourage future respondents in immigration 
hearings to file suppression motions seeking additional exceptions.84 
A. The First, Second, and Ninth Circuits Ignore the Janis Cost-Benefit 
Test and the Court’s Reasoning in Lopez-Mendoza 
The bulk of the Supreme Court’s Lopez-Mendoza decision 
applied the Janis cost-benefit test to determine whether the 
exclusionary rule is appropriate in immigration hearings. The First, 
Second, and Ninth Circuits fail to apply the Janis test in their cases 
dealing with an egregious exception to the Lopez-Mendoza rule.85 As 
this was the basis of the decision in Lopez-Mendoza, the lower courts 
should use the Janis cost-benefit test to determine whether 
exceptions to Lopez-Mendoza should be created. Such analysis would 
allow for more predictability than the broad, current Ninth Circuit 
rule. If an egregious violation has occurred, then the benefit of 
excluding evidence from the violation increases due to a desire to 
prevent such extreme misconduct by immigration agents. Courts 
should show how the extreme misbehavior would tip the cost-
benefit scale and lead to the opposite conclusion the Court reached 
in Lopez-Mendoza. 
A probable reason the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the Janis test 
in its case law addressing the egregious exception is that it would be 
extremely difficult to apply the test and reach a different conclusion 
than the Court did in Lopez-Mendoza without contradicting Justice 
O’Connor’s reasoning in that case.86 Still, while it would have been 
difficult, it would not have been impossible if the Ninth Circuit had 
focused on differentiating the facts of Lopez-Mendoza—which only 
encompassed workplace raids—to Gonzalez-Rivera where a specific 
automobile passenger had been pulled over and targeted. If the 
Ninth Circuit had applied the test required from Lopez-Mendoza it 
 
 84. The court could have sought to discourage this with language in Lopez-Rodriguez 
that would discourage respondents in immigration hearings from seeking additional 
exceptions. However, no such language was used. 
 85. See, e.g., Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2008). 
The Ninth Circuit quoted the egregious language from Lopez-Mendoza, but limited its 
discussion to the rest of Lopez-Mendoza to the statement: “In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the 
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not generally apply in 
deportation proceedings, where the sole issues are identity and alienage.” Id. (citing Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034). The Ninth Circuit never mentioned the Janis test or cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 86. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1045–46. 
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would not have developed such an open-ended rule requiring the 
time consuming case-by-case analysis the majority sought to avoid in 
Lopez-Mendoza. 
B. The Perverse Incentive of Encouraging Lawbreaking by Immigrants 
in Order to Discourage Officer Misconduct 
Having a broad rule that allows immigrants to seek use of the 
exclusionary rule, such as the Ninth Circuit’s rule, encourages the 
filing of frivolous claims. In all likelihood, Justice White, in his Lopez-
Mendoza dissent, was correct in stating that immigrants will be more 
likely to utilize the exclusionary rule than subsequent § 1983 civil 
actions.87 However, he failed to point out the reason this is the 
case—an immigrant’s desire to remain in the country as long as 
possible. Those illegally present often have a strong incentive to 
remain in the country due to personal and family ties to their 
community and for employment reasons. If they can raise a routine 
argument in an immigration hearing that may require discovery or 
prolong an IJ’s decision-making process, then it can only be 
expected that the argument will be raised, whether valid or not given 
the facts of the situation.88 
While it could be argued that the same incentive regarding 
ongoing crimes is applicable in some criminal contexts and the 
exclusionary rule is still permitted, this argument fails because of the 
differences between criminal prosecution and civil hearings like 
immigration hearings. If evidence is suppressed in a criminal context, 
it can never be used against the accused because once the 
proceedings end, the matter cannot be retried due to the double 
jeopardy clause of the Constitution.89 However, this rule does not 
apply in immigration hearings.90 In an immigration hearing, the 
exact same evidence could be re-gathered immediately after the 
 
 87. Id. at 1055 (White, J., dissenting). 
 88. This reasoning admittedly assumes that some attorneys would ignore the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct that expressly forbid the filing of motions merely to 
delay resolution of the issue before the tribunal. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2 
(stating that a client does not have a valid interest in delaying resolution of an action); see also 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1) (allowing sanctioning of an attorney if a motion is filed with a court 
for the “improper purpose” of “caus[ing] unnecessary delay”).  
 89. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 90.  Cf. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964) (“And since there is no 
double-jeopardy limitation applicable to civil lawsuits, this is not the only judgment that may 
be awarded against petitioners for the same publication.”). 
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immigration judge suppresses the evidence. For example, 
immigration agents could simply follow the immigrant out of the 
building, and as long as they could show reasonable suspicion, they 
could request documentation and seek a confession.91 The 
immigrant could then be brought back before the immigration judge 
based on the exact same claim as before—that her presence was 
illegal. The fact that immigration officials can bring the same claim in 
a subsequent action lessens any potential impact of the exclusionary 
rule. 
No judicial system should encourage law breaking. A criminal, 
once caught, will be reluctant to re-commit the same crime because 
of the fear of being caught again. There is no such incentive for an 
immigrant that is not deported due to officer misconduct; instead, 
the immigrant will simply continue to remain in the country 
illegally.92 
C. The Supreme Court Does Not Favor Use of the Exclusionary Rule 
Over Other Remedies, but This Is Precisely What the Ninth Circuit 
Rule Does 
It is unlikely that the current Supreme Court will uphold cases 
that expand the exclusionary rule. The Court illustrated its lack of 
enthusiasm when it comes to the exclusionary rule last session in 
Herring v. United States by stating: “The exclusion of evidence ‘has 
always been our last resort, not our first impulse.’”93 Much has been 
written on the exclusionary rule, and this Note does not explore the 
issue in depth. Suffice it to say that since the publication of Dallin 
Oaks’s oft-cited article on the subject in 1970,94 the Court has 
 
 91. In this hypothetical situation the officers conduct a mere stop. If they could show 
they had probable cause before or after the stop, they could re-arrest the immigrant and 
demand documentation. 
 92. I recognize that criminals who “get off” may be emboldened and commit similar 
crimes again. Even if this is the case, there is no indication of this at the time of dismissal, and 
the public can hope that such crimes will not be committed. However, in the case of an 
undocumented immigrant, after being arrested and before appearing before an IJ, the 
immigrant has already turned down voluntary departure. It is extremely unlikely that the 
immigrant will later choose to depart voluntarily after being released from custody. 
 93. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (Bea, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009)).  
 94. Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 665 (1970) (providing an extensive analysis of the effect of the exclusionary rule on law 
enforcement and arguing that the rule be abolished and replaced with civil remedies); see also 
Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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repeatedly chosen not to increase the use or importance of the 
exclusionary rule. However, in many instances, like Herring, it has 
limited the rule.95 
The strongest argument in support of granting the rehearing en 
banc in Lopez-Rodriguez was the fact that it expanded the use of the 
exclusionary rule. As Judge Bybee alluded to in his Lopez-Rodriguez 
concurrence, if the Supreme Court were to take up the issue it would 
almost surely strike down the Ninth Circuit rule.96 As the rule stands, 
it defines a broad exception to the Court’s holding in Lopez-
Mendoza, and invites further expansion of the exception, which will 
also expand the use of the exclusionary rule. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Lopez-Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit expanded and further 
entrenched a rule that fails to follow the Supreme Court’s precedent 
in Lopez-Mendoza. In determining whether the egregious exception 
should apply, thus allowing the suppression of evidence in an 
immigration hearing, the court relied on the Circuit’s reasonable 
officer conduct standard. The court then used Supreme Court 
precedent to show that nonconsensual entry of a residence by a 
peace officer is unreasonable. Combining these two rules, the court 
held that the immigration officers’ entry in Lopez-Rodriguez was 
unreasonable, and therefore, an egregious Fourth Amendment 
violation. 
The Ninth Circuit wrongly concluded that the egregious 
exception, which is dicta from a plurality section of the Supreme 
Court’s Lopez-Mendoza opinion, is a valid basis for developing broad 
case law and establishing numerous exceptions to Lopez-Mendoza. 
Furthermore, Lopez-Rodriguez widens the circuit split on this issue 
and will hinder immigration enforcement by allowing routine 
motions seeking suppression due to Fourth Amendment violations. 
This is exactly what Lopez-Mendoza sought to prevent. 
The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split not by merely 
adopting one circuit’s interpretation of the Lopez-Mendoza 
 
1365 (2008) (“Oaks’s article is the second most cited of those published by The University of 
Chicago Law Review in its seventy-five year history . . . .”). 
 95. Lopez-Mendoza is an excellent example of this as the holding barred the exclusionary 
rule from immigration hearings. 468 U.S. at 1050.  
 96. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2008) (Bybee, J., 
concurring). 
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exception, but by abandoning the egregious exception altogether. 
The three key reasons the Court should abandon the egregious 
exception are (1) any use of the exception should have been based 
on cost-benefit analysis, which no circuit has done, (2) a perverse 
incentive underlies using the exclusionary rule for ongoing crimes, 
and (3) the Court has continually weakened the exclusionary rule 
while a broad egregious exception strengthens the rule. 
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